On Monday morning, an 85-word Truth Social post from U.S. President Donald Trump—in which he threatened a “whole civilization will die tonight”—set off a global guessing game about what might happen when 8 p.m. EST arrived, his latest deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. At 6:32 p.m. EST, Trump posted again, this time announcing a provisional two-week ceasefire among Iran, Israel, and the United States. The ceasefire marks the first pause in 39 days of fighting across the Middle East, which began with strikes that killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In the weeks that followed, Iran launched waves of missile strikes against Israel, targeted America's Gulf partners, and closed the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a global oil shortage.

Asian countries, which receive roughly 80 percent of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, were hit particularly hard by its closure and have watched the situation closely. Pakistan ultimately emerged as a key mediator between Washington and Tehran, brokering Monday’s agreement that paused U.S. attacks on Iran in exchange for opening the Strait. In this edition of Asia ASAP, Asia Society Policy Institute experts unpack how countries across Asia are responding to the ceasefire between Iran, the U.S., and Israel—and how they are preparing for what may come next.

Pakistan as a Peacemaker

By Farwa Aamer

As Pakistan stepped in as a key intermediary between the U.S. and Iran, its role reflected a pragmatic move shaped by both opportunity and strategic necessity. Islamabad occupies a rare, sweet spot: it maintains good ties with a broad range of regional actors directly impacted by the conflict, as well as both Washington and Tehran, giving it sufficient credibility as a go-between. Its improved relationship with the U.S. over the past year, alongside close engagement with President Trump, appears to have strengthened its access in Washington and added weight to its diplomatic outreach at a critical moment.

Crucially, Islamabad’s role is also underpinned by domestic and strategic imperatives. Escalating tensions threatened energy supply routes and fuel price stability, posing economic risks. At the same time, sectarian sensitivities at home, coupled with Pakistan’s security commitments to Saudi Arabia, raised the prospect of entanglement in a broader regional conflict, one that Islamabad has strong incentives to avoid. Facilitating de-escalation, therefore, aligned directly with its national interests, while also allowing it to reassure key partners and avoid difficult strategic trade-offs.

Pakistan’s mediation efforts signal a more deliberate foreign policy aimed at establishing itself as a regional and global actor that cannot be easily sidelined. This episode marks a clear shift from the periphery toward a more confident and assertive middle-power role. Nonetheless, the overall situation and the ceasefire remain fragile, and as Islamabad prepares to host U.S.–Iran talks this Friday, all eyes are on whether this opening can be transformed into a durable, structured diplomatic process capable of producing longer-term regional solutions.

China’s Calculus

By Lyle Morris

The ceasefire in Iran, reportedly partially facilitated by Beijing, represents an opportunity for Beijing to flex its diplomatic muscle. China’s proactive role comes on the heels of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s request for China to “mediate” the escalating conflict, citing China’s successful diplomatic role in brokering an Iranian rapprochement with Saudi Arabia a few years ago. However, going forward, China is unlikely to be the main peace-broker to the conflict, as the centers of gravity reside in Washington, Jerusalem, and Tehran.

While American strikes on Iran are undoubtedly a setback for Chinese interests in the region. China has assiduously cultivated close diplomatic, economic and military relations with Tehran since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took power in 1989. Beijing is confident that its long-term commitment to Iran will ultimately pay off, especially if the Iranian regime reconstitutes under the Ayatollah’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, who some believe has a positive view of China.

If I’m sitting in Beijing, I’m perfectly fine to sit back and let the U.S. get bogged down in another quagmire in the Middle East and continue to let Washington exhaust its resources, munitions and energy. All it’s doing is distracting U.S. attention away from the Indo-Pacific and China, which ultimately benefits Beijing.

Asia Caught in the Cross-Fire

By Emma Chanlett-Avery

Asian leaders welcomed the ceasefire, but continued operations to ease the economic shocks and spiking energy prices that have rocketed their economies since the start of the war. Several stressed that, even if the conflict is resolved, the economic impact could take many more weeks or months to stabilize. Many governments have instituted emergency measures, including subsidies, cash handouts, and other price support mechanisms to cushion the blow to consumers. Many lower-income countries channeled direct subsidies in cooking fuel and diesel to the most financially vulnerable, both to ease pain and, in some cases, suppress unrest. Several Southeast Asian countries—including Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia—have mandated that employees work from home more often, while Thailand’s fishing industry has docked large portions of its fleet due to rising fuel costs.

Many Asian governments have rushed to secure alternative energy supplies from exporters like Oman, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Japan and South Korea released some of their strategic petroleum reserves in coordination with the International Energy Agency to help stabilize global markets. Hours after all sides agreed to a ceasefire, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi held a phone call with Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian to urge de-escalation and to negotiate passage through the Straits of Hormuz for Japanese ships. Nearly all of the countries in the region anticipate hardship in financing the subsidies and building public support for the ongoing shocks to their economies.

Dive Deeper with ASPI:

• Watch Farwa Aamer, Jane Mellsop, and Akshay Mathur examine how the U.S.-Israel’s airstrikes on Iran are reshaping economic outlooks, energy security, and foreign policy across South Asia.

• Listen to Danny Russel and Wendy Cutler unpack how China is thinking about the U.S.-Iran.-Israel War, especially as it prepares for Trump’s visit to Beijing.

• Read Farwa Aamer and Emma Chanlett-Avery’s analysis of how leading middle powers in Asia and beyond are redefining strategic autonomy, which partnerships warrant close attention, and how these evolving alignments are reshaping the global order.

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Despite a politically charged atmosphere and scattered reports of violence and electoral irregularities, the polls were broadly regarded as peaceful and credible. The Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s caretaker government, Muhammad Yunus, framed the outcome as the “advent of a new Bangladesh.”

The election itself was born out of upheaval. The student-led July Movement of 2024—driven by Gen Z activists demanding accountability, fair elections, and institutional reform—precipitated the collapse of Hasina’s government that August. The February 12 election thus served not only as a transfer of power, but as a referendum on whether street protests and youth mobilization could translate into lasting change at the ballot box. Asia Society Policy Institute experts unpack what the election results mean in our latest edition of Asia ASAP.

BNP Claims a Decisive Mandate

- By Rishi Gupta

Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League was barred from contesting in the 2026 elections after being banned by the Yunus government. Hasina herself remains in exile in India, facing charges of crimes against humanity over her alleged role in a violent and deadly crackdown on the July protests. Without the Awami League, the February 12 contest emerged as one between the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI). The two parties have been key allies in the past and even formed a coalition government in 2001.

BNP party leader Tarique Rahman is the son of Khaleda Zia, who served as the prime minister during the 1991-1996 and 2001-2006 BNP-led governments. After two decades of self-imposed exile from Bangladesh, Tarique returned to Dhaka in December of 2025. Just two months later, he is poised to assume the position of prime minister—a remarkable feat.

So what helped the BNP win?

First, the BNP succeeded in diverting Awami League voters by presenting itself as a moderate and liberal front when comparted to Jamaat-e-Islami’s more radical Islamist ideology. Jel subtly advocated the implementation of Islamic laws and for a limited role for women in the workforce and the party’s leadership. While the party has emerged as the main opposition, its vision for Bangladesh does not align with the country’s cultural syncretism and secularism, something Hasina was credited with protecting. For an aspiring youth who led a movement against Hasina regime and toppled it, the Jamaat-led government would have been another challenge, taking the country backwards.

Second, the youth activists that led the Gen Z movement were expected to step into leadership roles after toppling the Hasina government. Unfortunately, youth leadership—despite the emergence of figures like Nahid Islam during the July Movement—failed to consolidate into a credible political alternative to BNP. After a brief role as an advisor in the Yunus-led interim government, Islam and his colleagues founded the National Citizens Party (NCP) in February 2025. But with only a year before the election to build a grassroots base, the NCP struggled to operate on its own. Instead, it decided to join hands with Jel in a risky political gamble that ultimately failed: Many of the young voters that made up the NCP’s base remain wary of JeI’s regressive approach towards girls and women. While Nahid secured a seat in Dhaka-11, his party remains in the single digits after contesting just 30 of the 299 seats up for grabs in Parliament.

Therefore, what might have been an opportunity for the Jel to present a reformist face instead became a setback for the NCP, allowing BNP to attract youth voters instead. For youth, this election presented an opportunity to build a Nooton Bangladesh (new Bangladesh), but choices before them were still limited to BNP and JeI, with NCP still struggling to define a viable national role.

Another factor that led to BNP’s success at the polls was their ability to consolidate the Hindu minority vote, which constitutes approximately 10% of the national total. Minorities have a key role in Dhaka’s political calculus and have been a stronghold for the Awami League, as Hasina was seen as a strong advocate of Bangladesh’s secular structure. However, violence against minorities in Bangladesh has remained a challenge, and, in the absence of the Awami League, minorities were wary of Jamaat’s hardline approach, opting instead the BNP.

With results out and BNP set to lead the new government, party leader Tarique Rahman will have a huge mandate to deliver, including reforms to the July Charter, which was put to a vote during the election. Voters responded positively to the charter’s implementation, and it is set to be put through a parliamentary process under the BNP government, which may further work on it before giving it a final nod. The mandate will play a key role in shaping Bangladesh’s religious outlook—between secularism and radical Islam—and will be impactful in shaping regional engagement, especially with India.

“Bangladesh First” Foreign Policy?

— By Farwa Aamer

Bangladesh has concluded one of its most consequential elections in decades, following the student-led July 2024 uprising and a fragile interim phase. That a reform-minded electorate returned a party rooted in dynastic politics is notable. But the mandate reflects fatigue with the previous order and a clear refusal to allow the far right to consolidate ground.

Foreign policy will test the new government’s maturity. Relations with India hit a nadir after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster and her continued presence there. The BNP’s almost “Bangladesh First” like rhetoric suggests repatriation demands and tougher positioning on border issues may remain in play. Yet geography imposes limits. The two countries share a long, porous border, energy interdependence, critical water-sharing frameworks, and substantial trade ties that anchor Dhaka to New Delhi. A pragmatic reset is in the interest of both sides. India has already signaled willingness to work with a newly elected government, and a proactive outreach to a BNP-led administration is likely.

With Pakistan, ties have been quietly warming. Trade has resumed and discussions around potential JF-17 procurement point to expanding defense cooperation. Bangladesh may find space to maintain workable relations with both India and Pakistan, balancing rather than choosing.

China will remain central. It is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and has investments across infrastructure, energy, and industrial projects, alongside agreements supporting drone manufacturing. China has also benefited from any perceived vacuum in Western engagement, consolidating its footprint across South Asia. If India-Bangladesh ties remain strained, Beijing’s leverage will only grow.

That dynamic draws in the United States. Recent tariff reductions to 19 percent and duty-free access for apparel using U.S.-produced cotton and man-made fiber provide tangible relief to Bangladesh’s garment sector. The U.S. objective is clear: sustain commercial interdependence while limiting Dhaka’s structural drift toward Beijing.

Looking ahead, the new government’s task will be to leverage relations with all major powers to Bangladesh’s strategic advantage, while avoiding overreliance on any single partner.

Dive Deeper with ASPI:

• Register for our upcoming webinar, “Bangladesh After the Vote: Democracy, Reform, and Foreign Policy Outlook”, which will be held from 9-10am EST on February 19. The panelists will include Dr. Fahmida Khatun, Dr. Sreeradha Datta, and Ambassador Shahed Akhter. Farwa Aamer will moderate.

• Read Bryanna Entwistle’s analysis of February 8 Thai elections, “Establishment Forces Prevail as Thailand’s Progressives Fall Short.”

• Read Hunter Marston’s coverage of the recent elections in Myanmar, “Military Elections Will Not Resolve Myanmar’s Deeper Problems”.

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On Friday, December 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited New Delhi for an annual meeting between Russia and India, marking the first time that he has visited India since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The bilateral summit comes as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi navigates increasing pressure from the United States on Indian imports of Russian oil, reflecting New Delhi’s greater challenge of balancing its own strategic interests with those of its partners across the globe. The summit provided a platform for the two countries to reach a slew of economic and commercial agreements and showed that despite external pressures from Washington, neither India nor Russia has the intention to dilute their relationship.

In this edition of Asia ASAP, Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) experts provide their rapid reactions to the summit’s outcomes. Subscribe for access to more expert analysis of breaking news events across the Asia Pacific.

Modi’s Careful Strategic Calculus

By Farwa Aamer, Director of South Asia Initiatives

The Modi-Putin meeting became a test of how much strategic room India still has to balance between Washington and Moscow. India reduced some Russian oil inflows to ease tensions with Washington, yet it also needed to signal to Moscow that the partnership retains depth, particularly in people-to-people ties, defense cooperation, civil nuclear energy, and long-term economic planning.

The optics of the meeting were undoubtedly warm, and though the deliverables were more modest than anticipated, the clearest progress came in economic cooperation. The overall approach suggests that India is trying to preserve its relationship with Russia, while gradually reshaping it in ways that reduce exposure to sanctions and geopolitical shocks.

Pressure did not come from Washington alone. Several European capitals voiced unease in the lead-up to the summit, adding another layer of complexity. India does not want to dilute its ties with Russia, both to avoid appearing susceptible to Western pressure and to prevent Moscow from drifting further toward Beijing at a time when India’s own relationship with China remains complicated. Yet New Delhi also has a potential U.S. trade deal on the horizon and ongoing negotiations with the EU, both of which it cannot afford to jeopardize.

In the end, the Modi-Putin meeting captured the central dilemma of India’s foreign policy today. India wants to maintain a broad network of strategic partnerships, but doing so now requires far more careful calibration. The Russia relationship remains important, as do India’s economic and strategic ties with the West. The balancing act continues, but the frictions are more visible, and the space for smooth navigation is narrowing.

An Economic Summit in New Delhi

By Akshay Mathur, Senior Director, ASPI Delhi

This year’s India-Russia summit could be branded as an ‘economic summit.’ The launch of a new ‘Programme of Economic Cooperation’ as a roadmap to achieve the target of $100 billion in trade by 2030 defined the spirit of the negotiations.

For starters, fixing the trade imbalance is now a priority. Russia has had a $58.9 billion surplus with India in FY 2024-25—nearly one-fifth of India’s total trade deficit and second only to China. Going forward, Indian pharmaceutical, agricultural, and marine exports will be welcomed in Russia. Multiple references by both leaders to the FTA with the Eurasian Economic Union signaled their preferences for a regional approach towards trade.

At the Russia-India Business Forum, Prime Minister Modi made a clarion call to develop a “simplified, predictable mechanism” for conducting business, presumably to mitigate the sanctions imposed by the EU, UK and the United States. For instance, India cut oil from Russia by 38% in October 2025 as sanctions on Russian oil became stricter. The direct sanctioning of Nayara Energy, located in Gurjarat and in which Rosneft and other Russian companies have majority stakes, is also an area for concern for Delhi.

Therefore, it was no surprise that a focus of the meeting was on bilateral settlements through national currencies, interoperability of the national payment systems, financial messaging systems and central bank digital currency platforms, and mechanisms for insurance and reinsurance. President Putin reminded New Delhi that 96% of trade is already being settled through national currencies: Sber, a Russian bank, launched rupee-denominated letters of credit for Indian exporters this week. The Governor of Russia’s central bank was part of the official delegation, as was the CEO of Rosneft.

Moscow Puts Its Asia Diversification Drive on Display

By Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security at ASPI’s Center for China Analysis

Putin’s two-day visit to India is an important step in diversifying Russia’s relations in Asia. While China remains Russia’s most important trade and diplomatic relationship in Asia, India offers Moscow a neutral economic partner at a time of increasing isolation for Putin due to the war in Ukraine. In that sense, Putin’s high-profile meeting with Modi can be viewed as an effort to expand Russia’s relations with other Asian nations beyond China, to include providing a much-needed lifeline for Moscow’s economy.

A slew of economic, trade, and defense agreements were signed between the two leaders. But the two biggest takeaways from the meeting relate to energy and defense.

On energy, Putin said “we are ready to continue ensuring the uninterrupted supply of fuel for the rapidly growing Indian economy.” India’s foreign secretary Vikram Misri told reporters that the recent U.S. sanctions imposed on Russian oil were discussed, without specifying India’s position on its purchases. Putin desperately needs oil exports to continue to New Delhi, as India represents Russia’s second largest importer of crude shipments behind China.

Modi is in a difficult position. Increasing oil imports from Russia would expose India to continued U.S. sanctions, while decreasing imports would severely damage the most important avenue of economic cooperation between the two nations. However, it is likely that Modi will ensure oil flows continue, despite pressure from Washington.

On defense, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and his Russian counterpart Andrei Belousov on Thursday underscored strong bilateral military ties based on “a deep sense of trust, common principles and mutual respect.” Singh said India was committed to developing local defense manufacturing while Belousov said that Russia is “ready to support India towards becoming self-reliant in the field of defense production.”

In related news, Bloomberg reported that India will pay about $2 billion to lease a nuclear-powered submarine from Russia, finalizing delivery of the vessel after roughly a decade of talks. India expects to take delivery of the vessel within two years. Under the lease terms, the Russian attack sub cannot be used in combat, but will help Indian sailors train in nuclear-submarine operations as it builds its own vessels. This latter development is significant, as India remains Russia’s largest procurer of arms in Asia. While China-Russia defense cooperation continues to expand, India remains Russia’s most important defense partner in Asia.

Putin views India as an important bulwark in Asia that provides Moscow an alternative to Beijing. The recent visit to New Delhi succeeded in shoring up relations between India and Russia.

Dive Deeper with ASPI:

• Join us next week for a webinar on “U.S.-India 2025: Strains, Shifts, and the Road Ahead,” featuring Lisa Curtis, Akshay Mathur, and Jane Mellsop in conversation with Farwa Aamer.

• Listen to the latest podcast episode of Asia Inside Out, featuring Raja Mohan in conversation with Rorry Daniels on “Indian Foreign Policy and the Rebalancing of Asia.”

• Subscribe to South Asia Snapshot, a monthly newsletter by Farwa Aamer on key geopolitical, economic, environmental, and social happenings in the region.

On Thursday, U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for a highly anticipated 90-minute face to face meeting in Busan, South Korea. The meeting marked the final engagement of Trump’s nearly week-long Asia tour, during which he also made stops in Kuala Lumpur for the ASEAN Summit and Tokyo. After the meeting with Xi, Trump announced that the two leaders had de-escalated their trade standoff, agreeing to a yearlong ceasefire that would roll back steep tariffs and reopen U.S. access to Chinese rare earth metals, among other things.

In this first edition of Asia ASAP, Asia Society Policy Institute experts provide their rapid reactions to the summit outcomes. Subscribe for access to more expert analysis of breaking news events across the Asia-Pacific.

A One-Year Trade Truce

- By Wendy Cutler

The long-awaited Trump-Xi meeting was an important step in stabilizing the U.S.-China bilateral relationship by turning down the temperature on recent escalatory actions by both countries for at least one year.

However, the announced outcomes do little to resolve underlying structural issues that are at the heart of bilateral economic tensions, including exports of excess capacity manufactured goods, excessive subsidies and other types of state support, and unfair trade practices. As such, this truce, while intended to last one year, may not even last that long.

Unlike the Phase One U.S.-China trade agreement concluded during Trump’s first term, this time around Beijing drove a hard bargain insisting on getting paid for every concession it made. Specifically, Beijing succeeded in getting the U.S. to reduce existing tariffs by ten percentage points, delaying for one year the export control affiliates rule and unwinding its Section 301 actions on ports, including high fees for Chinese ships.

This is in sharp contrast to the other trade agreements that Trump has concluded with Asian partners in recent days, which were heavily tilted in the U.S.’ favor. Trump has met his match with China, which has shown that two can play at this game. Beijing has clearly demonstrated it knows its leverage points and is willing to activate them.

It’s welcome news that Beijing agreed to hold off implementing its recently announced sweeping rare earth export restrictions for one year. However, we should expect Beijing to use this threat as a hammer over the U.S.’ head, making U.S. tariff threats less credible and more costly going forward.

Moreover, U.S. farmers will be glad to hear that China will resume significant purchases of soybeans, but the actual dollar amounts have yet to be announced. Finally, it’s welcome news that China will take further unspecified steps on curbing fentanyl precursor exports.

This one-year truce will give breathing room to both sides to reduce dependencies on each other in strategic sectors. For the U.S., this means stepping up work with allies and partners to develop alternative sources of rare earths, building on the multiple bilateral agreements with Australia, Malaysia and others announced in recent weeks, including by linking them together in a plurilateral critical minerals agreement.

Will the Stabilization Last?

- By Rorry Daniels

Presidents Trump and Xi succeeded in stemming the active bleeding in the relationship, but whether the bandage will stick remains to be seen. It’s very positive and stabilizing when the leaders meet and confirm that neither side wants to destroy the other, but the groundwork hadn’t been laid for this meeting to produce more than a vibe check. The post-meeting comments and announcements don’t reach the status quo ante on trade or detail specific commitments on security issues.

President Trump’s announcement of U.S. resumption of nuclear testing is both reflective of long-standing U.S. frustration on China’s nuclear build-up as well as potential leverage to encourage arms control talks. However, the key priority remains ending the war in Ukraine, and President Trump’s expectations that he will receive genuine support from China on this issue have been raised. China now has to flesh out its commitments and deliver.

The U.S has work to do as well. What needs to happen next to maintain the stabilization is a period of trust building where both sides detail and deliver on their commitments and create the conditions for more substantive discussions. This means that both sides need to have full control of their respective bureaucracies and at minimum pursue a ‘no surprises’ policy. China would be wise to lift its sanctions on National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Marco Rubio so that security issues can be covered in subsequent rounds.

However, the structure of a year-to-year agreement suggests that continuous negotiation will be a permanent feature of U.S.-China relations moving forward, with high potential to revive cycles of tit-for-tat escalation when one side or the other feels its expectations are not being met. Odds remain high that all the associated market and political volatility we have seen over the last nine months continues indefinitely as political priorities shift and events occur that require the U.S. or China to react. And evidence to date suggests that officials in the second Trump administration are unwilling or unable to constrain the president from issuing threat or punishment via social media while they work to strike a durable deal.

Taipei may be breathing a sigh of relief today that Taiwan wasn’t raised in the meeting, but discomfort could eventually set in about why it didn’t come up and what its absence in Beijing’s agenda for this leaders’ meeting means for China’s Taiwan policy moving forward. Frankly, no news is probably good news in the Taiwan Strait. The rounds of negotiations leading up the meeting were run by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant and his counterpart He Lifeng, rather than the national security officials who would focus on strategic issues like Taiwan policy. Of course, Xi could have raised the issue anyway and Trump seemed prepared for him to do so. However, Xi may not have wanted to be in a position where adverse comments on Taiwan would force him to take actions in the Taiwan Strait as a political signal, especially with the churn of leadership at high levels in the PLA.

Buying Time for Beijing

- By Neil Thomas

Xi is finally getting the “new type of great power relations” he sought between China and the United States when he first took office in 2012. Trump is dealing with China as a fellow superpower, and he clearly respects Xi’s status as a powerful leader on the world stage. Direct communication between the American and Chinese presidents can reduce risks, clarify red lines, and create space for selective cooperation; efforts to build a more peaceful and prosperous world—and greater stability—should be welcomed.

Yet little has changed in the broader, structural picture of bilateral relations. The two sides have not resolved the fundamental economic and technological conflicts that underpin U.S.-China strategic competition, from market access and data governance to export controls, supply-chain security, and the race to dominate critical technologies. Frictions will persist, still, even if the tone improves. It is not all plain sailing ahead. Beijing could use this diplomatic truce to buy time to build the bureaucratic capacity necessary to implement rare earth and other strategic export controls in a more calibrated, effective fashion. That will give China additional leverage in future U.S.-China negotiations.

Dive Deeper with ASPI:

• Sign up for a rapid-response webinar, “Assessing Trump’s Asia Tour,” to be held October 31, 8:30am U.S. Eastern Time. The panel discussion will feature Wendy Cutler, Shay Wester, Michelle Ye Hee Lee, and Emma Chanlett-Avery.

• Based in NYC? Please join ASPI for an in-person program on November 4, “After Gyeongju: APEC 2025 Outcomes and the Future of Regional Cooperation,” featuring Chul Chung, Richard Cantor, Daniel Russel, and Wendy Cutler in a panel discussion. ROK Ambassador to the U.S. Kang Kyung-wha and U.S. Senior Official for APEC Casey Mace (pending) will provide keynote remarks.

• Read Neil Thomas’ recent op-ed for Time, “Why the Trump-Xi Summit May Disappoint.”