By Farwa Aamer and Emma Chanlett-Avery
Editors note: In this issue of Asia Policy Brief, Farwa Aamer, Director of South Asia Intitatives, and Emma Chanlett-Avery, Director of Political-Security Affairs, unpack the state of the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships after a busy May. Following the Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing, foreign ministers from the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India met for a Quad Summit in New Delhi. That weekend, defense ministers and delegations from across the Indo-Pacific met in Singapore for the annual Shangri-La Dialogues. Aamer and Chanlett-Avery examine where interests converged and fault lines emerged across these two meetings.
State of Affairs: One Week, Two Convenings
Two international convenings in May revealed both the promise and peril of President Trump’s approach to Indo-Pacific, leaving partners and allies in the region on uncertain footing as they navigate the Trump’s evolving foreign policy priorities. While the Quad delivered in specific areas, rhetoric from the Shangri-la Dialogue produced both a softer tone on China and continued demands for Asian allies to spend more on defense.
The Quad foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi offered an important opportunity after the absence of a leaders’ summit last year had raised questions about its momentum. Convened on May 26 amid the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, energy market volatility, and growing uncertainty in the global economy, the meeting took place against a backdrop of increasingly complex geopolitical challenges.
The joint statement released after the meeting suggests a more focused and pragmatic Quad, advancing cooperation in maritime security, energy security, supply-chain resilience, and infrastructure development while reaffirming its commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. During the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the Quad as a “linchpin and cornerstone“ of U.S. strategy, offering some degree of reassurance to regional partners that the grouping still remains important to Washington’s Indo-Pacific approach.
Meanwhile, at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reiterated his call for American allies to spend more on their own defense. In a departure from the remarks of past defense secretaries, Hegseth made no mention of Taiwan nor of concern about China’s military expansion in the South China Sea. In contrast, the Japanese Minister of Defense underscored concern about China’s rapid military build-up and rebutted Beijing’s claims that Japan was developing a new militarism by reforming its defense practices.
Why It Matters: Questions Surrounding U.S.-China Policy Drives New Uncertainty for the Region
The Indo-Pacific has not featured prominently in the administration’s public strategic messaging since Rubio’s day one meeting with the Quad. The National Security Strategy also devoted limited attention to the region, leader-level Quad engagement has yet to materialize, and Washington’s diplomatic bandwidth has increasingly been consumed by crises elsewhere. Questions hence emerged about the organization’s place in the administration’s broader foreign policy priorities, leading some analysts to conclude that the Quad, as we know it, may be dead.
The Quad foreign ministers’ meeting took place amid a more strained U.S.-India dynamic. While both India and the United States remain publicly committed to expanding cooperation, particularly in emerging sectors such as critical minerals, trade tensions and policy divergences over the past year have impacted bilateral ties as well as the Quad’s broader cohesion. Still, tangible outcomes from the May meeting indicate that the group is chugging ahead, increasingly focused on practical cooperation and implementation in specific sectors. In New Delhi, the Quad launched the Indo-Pacific Energy Security Initiative and the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative Framework, suggesting that economic resilience, supply chain coordination, and resource security are central to the Quad’s value proposition. Australia, Japan, and India are already party to the U.S. led Pax Silica initiative.
Maritime cooperation similarly remains at the heart of the group’s agenda. Building on the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), the Quad committed to developing a Common Operational Picture across the Indo-Pacific and launched the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration to strengthen regional monitoring and information-sharing efforts. An initiative to work with Fiji to advance port infrastructure, alongside renewed commitments to engage with ASEAN, reflects an effort to deepen the Quad’s regional footprint through partnerships and capacity-building.
China continues to remain an important, if unstated, driver of the Quad’s agenda. References to economic coercion and opposition to unilateral actions that threaten regional peace and stability have long been embedded in the grouping’s mandate, but Washington’s evolving China policy injects some uncertainty into this shared concern — not just among the Quad, but among the U.S.’ Indo-Pacific partners more broadly.
During President’s Trump visit to Beijing in mid-May, Trump and Xi declared that the U.S.-China relationship has entered a period of “constructive strategic stability.” Hegseth’s speech at Shangri-La echoed this sentiment: His call for a Pacific free from domination by any single hegemon appeared to fortify a growing acknowledgement of China and the United States as peers. At the same time, Hegseth admonished U.S. allies for failing to invest more heavily in deterrence, without defining what threat was necessary to deter. The omission of any mention of Taiwan plays on both these themes: the exclusion could be interpreted as a nod to China’s priorities as well as a signal to allies that they cannot rely on U.S. military might for defense.
For Japan in particular, this turn in the U.S.’ China policy is daunting. Tokyo faces burden-sharing negotiations this year, and, despite doubling its defense budget, is bracing for steep increases in U.S. demands for contributions to host U.S. troops. Simultaneously, relations with China are dangerously unstable. Amid reports that Xi railed against Tokyo’s remilitarization to Trump, Beijing appears unwilling to back down. Stuck between rising demands from Washington and rising hostility from Beijing, Japan is struggling to shore up its security without straining its economy further.
In contrast, Seoul may have found some degree of reassurance from Hegseth’s remarks, as it is often cited as a “model ally” for boosting its own defense spending as a higher percentage of GDP. Although South Korea’s overriding concern of the threat from North Korea was barely mentioned in Hegseth’s speech, Seoul’s emergence as a major defense goods exporter garnered significant attention at the forum. Reduction in tension between China and the United States is also good news for Seoul, as it seeks to find the right balance between maintaining good economic relations with China and protecting the U.S. security alliance.
Like Seoul, New Delhi was praised at the Shangri-La Dialogue for its growing role in regional security—in his speech, Hegseth noted that India is “modernising its military to carry its share of the security burden” in the Indian Ocean., But after his speech, in response to a question, Hegseth also praised the Pakistani leadership for its U.S.-Iran mediation role and shared that the United States and Pakistan are developing a “true friendship.” Last May’s India–Pakistan conflict renewed tensions between the two South Asian neighbours. While New Delhi rejected U.S. claims of mediation (which Pakistan, on the other hand, embraced) and remains wary of Washington’s growing engagement with Islamabad, its response to Hegseth’s comments about Pakistan was notably restrained, underscoring the importance it attaches to maintaining the trajectory of U.S.–India relations after a difficult year.
What to Watch
The timing of the Quad meeting shortly after the Trump-Xi summit is significant. As Washington seeks to stabilize its relationship with Beijing, the Quad may need to derive its relevance less from explicit balancing against China and more from its ability to strengthen resilience among its members and partners. For countries such as India, that distinction could become increasingly important.
Watch whether the Quad’s foreign ministers’ meeting will lead to leader-level engagement this year. Until then, the Quad’s ability to maintain momentum may depend on whether its increasingly action-oriented agenda is sufficient to offset the absence of sustained top-level political attention.
Allies will be following if and how defense partners who spend more will receive preferential treatment on areas like arms sales and intelligence sharing. Japan’s burden-sharing negotiations may provide a test of how an ally that is spending more is still considered a “free-loader.” Another area that will be keenly watched is the extent to which Trump defends Japan from Xi’s withering criticism of Tokyo’s “remilitarization” in their anticipated meetings in 2026.
How meaningfully will middle power engagement develop as the contours of the U.S.-China relationship play out? Although tension between Washington and Beijing is alarming to many regional powers, better Xi-Trump dynamics brings its own challenges as countries navigate an uncertain strategic terrain. AI guardrails, cooperation on critical minerals, new commercial arms partnerships, and energy cooperation remain critical areas that demand middle power engagement.
Dive Deeper With ASPI
Register for a virtual panel discussion at 8:30am EST on June 10 exploring Japan’s move to allow lethal arms exports and its implications for industry, alliances, and security strategy under the Takaichi government.
Check out Farwa Aamer’s latest issue of “South Asia Snapshot”, in which she unpacks the signals, strategy, and stakes that defined the region in May.
Read Emma Chanlett-Avery and Farwa Aamer’s report “Cementing the Quad in the Indo-Pacific.”